

THE ETHICAL FRAGMENTS OF DEMOCRITUS: THE PROBLEM OF THE AUTHENTICITY *

A. SOME REMARKS ON THE SURVIVAL OF D.'S ETHICAL WRITINGS

The question is closely connected with that of the authenticity of the surviving fragments. How and «why such an extraordinary number of short ethical fr. of Democritus were ready at hand for inclusion in Stobaeus' collection ... for the real problem is to account for the ensuing gap of some 700 years until Stobaeus»¹. The most famous historian of Greek Philosophy in our days accepts this remark as a general argument to justify his scepticism about the authenticity of the fr. attributed to Democritus ².

Let us follow the facts and testimonies on the problem:

1. Plato nowhere mentions Democritus at all ³. But D. is undoubtedly a historical person; therefore Plato's silence (due either to ignorance or to refusal to recognise a materialist opponent) cannot be reasonably used as an argument that D. did not write on Ethics.

2. Aristotle mentions D.'s scientific work but not his ethical writings. It is difficult to explain his silence, given that coming from

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1. Zeph Stewart, «Democritus and the Cynics», *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 63, 1958, 179-180.

2. Guthrie, *History*, II, 489 footn. 3.

3. Diog. Laertius, IX 40: πάντων γὰρ σχεδὸν τῶν ἀρχαίων μεμνημένος ὁ Πλάτων οὐδαμοῦ Δημοκρίτου διαμνημονεύει, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἔνθ' ἀντειπεῖν τι αὐτῷ δεῖσι ... This fact is used by Diogenes as a clear evidence that «Plato wished to burn all the writings of D. that he could collect...» (IX 40). Perhaps it is only an exaggeration of Plato's opposition to D.'s theories, however it does suggest that D.'s books might not have found a place in the Academy's library, through which other writers survived.

N. Greece he was more likely to have been acquainted (familiar) with D.'s ethical books as well. Hypotheses explaining this fact could be:

(a) Aristotle did not recognise D.'s ethical writings as an important contribution in that field of thought. He himself ignores Isocrates' «ad Demonicum» (a pamphlet full of admonition similar (in form) to that coming from D.'s fr.). He ignores Xenophon too.

(b) Aristotle disregarded D.'s ethical theory because of its materialistic foundation and lack of any allusion to teleological views; but he could have discussed D.'s materialism and rejected it.

(c) Seemingly improbable but not unbelievable: Aristotle did not know D.'s ethical writings.

3. Epicurus and his followers declared absolute independence from D.'s influence¹; they accused him² of speaking carelessly or confusing life, and tried to emphasise Epicurus' improvements on D.'s theories³.

4. Only Cynics favoured D.'s ethics as far as they found interest in them and «it was among them and their allies that his fr. were preserved ... and probably deformed for more convenient use»⁴. Of more specific Cynic interest is D.'s valuation of pain and autarkeia — both Cynic bywords — and of athambia, his concern with Fortune (Stewart p. 181).

Stewart's argument is that Seneca in a number of passages similar (in content) to D.'s fr.⁵ quotes his Cynic friend, Demetrius. But Stewart's parallels are not particularly imposing or persuasive (his hypothesis is a speculation only, as far as it concerns the person of Seneca's friend); and it should be noted that Seneca did not need a mediator, since he

1. Cicero, *de nat. deorum*, I. 33. 93: «Epicurus ... in Democritum ipsum, quem secutus est, fuerit ingratus» (Usener, *Epicurea*, fr. 235, p. 175). Cf. Cicero, *de finibus* I. 6.17 and I. 6.21 (Usener, fr. 234).

2. Diog. Laertius X 8 (Usener, fr. 238, p. 176. Arrighetti, *Epicuro*, p. 421): *Ληρόκριτον* (foolish man?). Cf. Plut. *adv. Colot.* 4 p. 1108F (VS 68B 156).

3. Diog. of Oinoanda, fr. 6.II. 3 ff. w (Chilton 12; Grilli 40): ἐσφάλη δ' ἀναξίως ἐκαστοῦ Δ. τὰς ἀτόμους μόνας κατ' ἀλήθειαν εἰπὼν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ νομιστέα. (allusion to fr. 9, 125). See also: D. of Oinoanda, fr. 33 III.2 (VS 68 A 50): ἂν γὰρ τῷ Δημοκρίτου τις χρήσῃται λόγῳ, μηδεμίαν μὲν ἐλευθέραν φάσκων τοῖς ἀτόμοις κείνησιν εἶναι διὰ τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλας σύνκρουσιν ἀστῶν, ... Ἐπίκουρος δὲ εἰς φῶς ἤγαγεν παρεγκλιτικὴν ὑπάρχουσαν. (Chilton, p. 57; Grilli, p. 78).

4. Stewart, *op. cit.*, p. 184.

5. Diels - Kranz, *Die Fragmente (der Vorsokratiker)*, 68B 117, 176, 210, 284, 175, 297, 55, 62, 174, 293, 244, 264, 144, 235, 4, 285, 191, 231, 295, 224, 283, 219.

himself in another passage¹ mentions a whole and outstanding book by Democritus: «on Euthumia».

5. To this evidence add that:

(a) D. was a provincial thinker; he was not known in Athens to his own surprise as he perhaps complains². He visited Athens some time during the last decades of the fifth century B.C. and certainly before 399 B.C. (when Socrates was condemned to death), as is implied from the above reference.

(b) Democritus had no famous disciples. Chance against which he fought³ seems to have worked against his fame in both these respects (his provincialism and lack of well-known followers).

(c) A general prejudice against materialism discouraged later thinkers from studying D.'s system and commenting on him.

6. From the above facts and remarks the following conclusions might be justified:

(a) The cultural environment in Greece during the centuries after D.'s death was such that thinkers either ignored his theories or fought them or did not welcome them. Two philosophical schools at least with a long history and great influence (we know that) did not favour D.'s teaching for different reasons (Academy - Epicureans).

We can also imagine that other thinkers disliked theories with materialistic orientation.

Democritus had dethroned Fortune, but during the centuries after his death it was deified not only by individuals but by whole communities.

(b) Only Cynics from their point of view seemed to have found interest in some of D.'s ideas, in so far as they were helped by them⁴.

Therefore: D.'s ethical writings were destined under such conditions to be ignored, forgotten or corrupted.

But we have strong evidence from other sources that some copies of D.'s ethical book(s) survived by some way or another and reached the hands of later writers or collectors who lived during the first three centuries of our era and whose testimony should be accepted as reliable.

1. Seneca is very clear when writing *chanc stabilem animi sedem*,

1. *De tranquillitate animi* II.3.

2. Diog. Laertius, IX 36 (*Diels - Kranz, Die Fragmente*, 68B 116).

3. fr. 119, 197.

4. Stewart, 180 ff.

Graeci euthumiam vocant, de qua Democriti volumen egregium est; ego tranquillitatem voco¹.

This is the first item of information about the survival of one of D.'s ethical books; we find it nearly four centuries after his death. There are strong reasons to accept that Seneca had a copy of D.'s book at hand:

(a) Seneca's expression is very clear affirmation for the existence of such a book, «On Euthumia», by Democritus.

(b) It is also an expression of admiration (impossible if he had not read such a book).

(c) Seneca was writing his own essay on the same subject; it is reasonable to assume that he had read a book on this subject written by a forerunner.

It should also be remembered that Seneca had some relations with Egypt and perhaps with the Library in Alexandria ².

2. At the end of the second century A.D. or at the beginning of the third, Clement of Alexandria giving a summary of the Abderites's views on the purpose of life writes: «Democritus in his book 'On the End' (teaches) euthumian... and many times he finishes (the chapters of his writing?) by saying:» [fr. 4(188) follows] ³.

It seems improbable that a learned man like Clement could write this, unless he had seen and read the book referred to.

3. During the last decades of the third century A. D. Diog. Laertius was so well informed about D.'s Chief Good (euthumia) that he knew that others had misunderstood it and he regarded it as his duty to overthrow the misapprehensions and give the correct meaning of D.'s term. He writes⁴: «The end of action is tranquillity, which is not identical with pleasure, as some ⁵ by false interpretation have understood, but

1. *De tranquillitate animi*, II. 3.

2. Seneca, *de tranquill. an.* 9, 5-6. Cf. also: Seneca's letters (edition with comments by W. Summers, Macmillan), letter 77th § 3: Seneca's uncle had been viceroy (praefectus) of Egypt for 16 years; he himself must have had an estate or business there.

3. Clem. *Stromata*, II. 130 *Diels - Kranz, Die Fragmente* 68B 4): ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ Ἀβδηρίται τέλος ὑπάρχειν διδάσκουσιν· Δημόκριτος μὲν ἐν τῷ περὶ τέλους τὴν εὐθυμίαν ... καὶ πολλάκις ἐπιλέγει· τέρψις γὰρ καὶ ἀτερπὴ οὖρος ...

4. Diog. Laertius IX 45 (*Diels - Kranz, Die Fragmente* 68A 1. 45).

5. Who were they? Perhaps the Cynics as Stewart (*op. cit.* p. 187) supposes. But why not some hedonists? Such an implication is more probable. In any case,

a state in which the soul continues calm and strong undisturbed by any fear or superstition or any other emotion».

I cannot find any reason to suppose that Diogenes could attack previous scholars (philosophers?) and correct them in such a categorical way, unless he had strong evidence at hand (perhaps a genuine copy of D.'s work). He also gives a list of D.'s ethical writings and adds¹: «The other works which some attribute to Democritus are either compilations from his writings or admittedly not genuine». This is a further piece of evidence that he used other sources.

The following conclusions seem to be sufficiently justified:

1. D. had written at least one book² on ethics («on euthumia» according to Seneca, «on the End» according to Clement of Alexandria).

2. A copy of such a book was used by Seneca, Clement, and Diogenes; the same book could have been available later to Stobaeus (our main source for Democritus' fr.).

3. The question formulated by Stewart and accepted by Guthrie has been answered. We have found a way (to explain the survival of D.'s ethical writings) which covers the period from D. to Stobaeus.

4. A probable haven (reservation store) for D.'s ethical writings was the Ptolemaic Library in Alexandria³, the doors of which were open for Clement and which Seneca also could have visited. That library was easily available to all citizens of the Roman Empire during the third and fourth centuries A.D.

Perhaps D.'s books found in the shelves of a tolerant and uprejudiced institution the place which was denied them in Athens.

B. SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON THE PROBLEM OF THE AUTHENTICITY OF D.'S FRAGMENTS

This question has a long history; it first appeared in Diog. Laertius'

Diogenes had another source, more reliable, giving him the right to correct misinterpretations.

1. Diog. Laertius, IX 49: τὰ δ' ἄλλα ὅσα τινὲς ἀναφέρουσιν εἰς αὐτὸν τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν αὐτοῦ διεσκέυασται, τὰ δ' ὁμολογουμένως ἐστὶν ἀλλότρια.

2. Even the length of some fr. (e.g. 191, 277-9) and the structure of some others (175, 191, 238, 257, 259, 262) indicate that they belonged to a longer context, from which they have been extracted.

3. The librarians of that institution would be reasonably interested in collecting the books of the philosopher of Abdera.

age. Immediately after he had given a list of D.'s genuine books, he remarked¹ that other writings attributed to him are either compilations or fabrications («admittedly not} genuine»). For modern scholarship² the dispute begun a century ago, when Lortzing pointed out the problem which briefly is as follows:

The frr. of D. now included in Diels-Kranz, *Frag. d. Vorsokratiker* (fifth and subsequent editions), can be divided into three groups according to the degree of the authenticity admitted by modern scholars:

1. frr. 1-34 and 116-168 extracted from various sources (ancient authors, commentators, lexicographers) are the only undisputed attributions³.

2. frr. 35-115 coming from the so-called Democrates' collection⁴ are strongly suspected to lack authenticity. Many of them are also included in the third group.

3. frr. 169-297 survived in Stobaeus' Florilegium. The shadow of suspicion is also cast on this group, on the ground that up to this point no bridge has been found to cover the period from D.'s death to Stobaeus' floruit (over 700 years).

Orelli had published (1819) a collection of over 200 frr. including the last two groups.

Lortzing investigated the question of identification of the two names Democrates and Democritus under whose names the two groups had survived⁵. Two other scholars⁶ of the last century assumed that most of the surviving frr. should be accepted as authentically Democrite-

1. Diog. Laertius, IX 49.

2. Main literature: *RE* Suppl. 12, 1970, col. 208 ff. [Steckel]. Z. Stewart, «D. and the Cynics», *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 63, 1958, 179-191. Guthrie, *Hist. of Gr. Philos.*, II 489, footn. 3. He gives a brief summary of earlier literature. Schmid-Stählin, *Gesch. d. Gr. Liter.*, I. 5., 1948, 276 ff. for further literature. M.L. West, «The sayings of D.», *Clas. Rev.* 19, 1969, 162.

3. Of these 15 only can be regarded as having importance for a reconstruction of D.'s ethical theory, namely: 2, 3, 4, 30, 31, 33, 118, 119, 145, 146, 149, 153, 154, 159, 160.

4. *Δημοκράτους γνῶμαι χρυσαῖ* were published for the first time by L. Holstenius, Rome 1638, from a Barberinii codex and by C.J. Orelli, Leipzig 1819, from a Palatine MS.

5. Lortzing, «Über die ethischen Fr. Demokrits», *Sophien-Gymnasium*, (VIII. Jahresbericht), Berlin 1873, pp. 1 ff.

6. R. Hirzel, «Demokrits Schrift *περὶ εὐθυμίας*», *Hermes* 15, 1879, 345-407. P. Natorp, *Die Ethika des Demokritos*, Marburg 1893.

an and tried to reconstruct D.'s ethical work (theory). Their attempt produced two other problems: the consistency of an ethical theory to be reconstructed from the surviving fr. and the compatibility of such a theory with the rest of D.'s system ¹.

Important contributions to the question of authenticity were made by two scholars during the 1920's; one attacking the authenticity, the other defending it ²; both in somewhat polemical tone. H. Diels had included both these collections in his second edition of «*Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*» and found a conciliatory but «vague compromise» by saying that: «Investigation of the contents forbids us either to accept them all uncritically or to reject them wholesale» ³ (transl. by Guthrie, *Hist.* II, 490).

The controversy continues; all later scholars who study D.'s moral fr. must first give their opinion on the problem of authenticity and the nature of the material itself, before saying anything else about it. Separate investigations into the problem of authenticity have made their appearance too ⁴.

Stewart ⁵ casts doubt upon the «foolish men's series» of fr. (197-206), for which Friedländer ⁶ had shown that they may have been lifted in their present state from the original work. Stewart argues that this group «is much more easily explained as part of the well known Cynic division of the world into wise men and fools or madmen». His reference to Diog. Laertius VI. 71 does not help his interpretation.

On the contrary, the following remarks support the attribution made by Stobaeus:

(a) fr. 197 is authenticated in its content and terminology by its similarity to other fr. attributed to D. beyond doubt ⁷.

1. A. Dyroff, *Demokritstudien*, München 1899.

2. H. Laue, «De Democriti fragmentis ethicis» (diss.), *Jahrbuch der Philosophischen Fakultät in Göttingen*, 1922. R. Philippson, «Demokrits Sittensprüche», *Hermes* 59, 1924, 369-419.

3. Diels-Kranz, *Die Fragmente* II 154: «Die inhaltliche Prüfung der Demokratesammlung gestattet weder alles kritiklos für echt noch alles für unecht zu halten».

5. Z. Stewart, «Democritus and the Cynics», *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 63, 1958, 179-191. M. L. West, «The sayings of Democritus», *Clas. Rev.* 19, 1969, 142. C.C.W. Taylor, «Pleasure, Knowledge and Sensation in Democritus», *Phronesis* 12, 1967, 6-27.

4. *op. cit.* p. 191 footn. 39. *RE* 12 col. 9 (Helm).

6. P. Friedländer, «Aufsatz zum 'Υποθήκαι Problem», *Hermes* 48, 1913, 603-616 (particularly pp. 610-611).

7. fr. 119, fr. 33 (cf. *ῥυσμοῦνται* - *μετρυσμοῖ*), fr. 7 (*ἐπιρυσμίη*). Cf. *Simpl. Phys.*,

(b) the content of fr. 202 is included in that of 191 (dovetails with that of 191).

(c) the word *τερπόμενοι* (frr. 200, 201) is confirmed by many other frr., two of which are beyond doubt (this term is unknown in Democritus' collection)¹.

(d) the tradition about the laughing philosopher² — and there are abundant stories about him — would encourage us to attribute these frr. to D. even if we lacked the attribution by Stobaeus. At least the question arises: why deny the attribution? because of the style?

(e) Friedländer³ correctly made a comparison to the well known Beatitudes (from the Sermon on the Mount) with their repetitive stylistic device. One might also recall Kipling's poem «If» with its numerous ifs⁴.

Finally in defending their authenticity we do not insist that these frr. were a continuous part of a text; possibly they belonged to a series of chapters; after each of them a longer text explaining and justifying each aphorism might have been attached. The collector may then have abstracted for his purpose the aphorisms as they are known to us⁵. Guthrie⁶ casts a general suspicion on the authenticity of both groups arguing (summarising previous literature) that:

«The grounds for suspicion are strong:

1. Many (of the frr.) are, even for their time, extremely commonplace and banal (36, 50, 53a, 54, 66, 81, 101, 268 and so forth).

28.15 (*Diels - Kranz, Fragmente* 68A 38) where *ῥυσμός*.

1. frr. 4, 146, 232, 241, 191, 194, 235, 188. More about it in the paragr. «on Criterion».

2. [Hippocr.] *Epist.* 10 (IX p. 320 Littré): ... ὁ δὲ (sc. Δημόκριτος) γελᾷ πάντα ... ὄρων. *Epist.* 17 (IX p. 360 Littré): ... τίς ἢ κενὴ σπουδὴ καὶ ἀλόγιστος, μηδὲν μανίης διαφέρουσα... More examples in *Diels - Kranz, Fragmente*, 68A 21 and S. Luria, *Democritea*, pp. 21-22.

3. *op. cit.*, p. 610-611. See Matthew, ch. E 3.

4. *R. Kipling's Verse*, Inclusive edition, 2nd impression, London 1934, p. 360. One more example from Nietzsche, given by Friedländer (*op. cit.*, p. 611): «Ich liebe die, welche, ... ich liebe den, welcher ...» usw.

5. Stewart in his final page (191, footn. 44) accepts that «not all fragments in Stobaeus and the other gnomologies were preserved, and therefore subjected to sifting and alteration, in the same way. Some of the political ones (e.g. B 266), and some of the longer ones (e.g. B 191), seem pretty surely to have come to Stobaeus through another and better protected excerpting tradition...».

6. *History*, II, 489-91. Cf. Stewart *op. cit.*, p. 188 and footn. 42.

2. Some are unoriginal (64, 65, 171, 236) echoing Heraclitus (40, 119, 85).

3. Some are astonishingly Socratic or Platonic: 45 (cf. Gorgias 479 E), 40, 77, 171 (cf. Apol. 30b), 173 (Meno 88A)...

The existence of these examples must cast considerable doubt on the selector's trustworthiness¹.

He also seems to accept Stewart's conclusion that D.'s frr. survived through a Cynic «sieve» and to adopt the following statement «if the sayings are genuine, the problem is to account for their survival over 700 years, when neither Plato nor Aristotle shows any knowledge of them»².

An account of the survival of D.'s ethical writings is given in the previous paragr. Here the grounds for suspicion presented by Guthrie will be briefly discussed.

1. The fact that some frr. seem to contain commonplace wisdom is no reason to suspect their authenticity. They became banal because they were true and simple apophthegms³.

2. Similarities or even excessive imitation between thinkers of the same or different ages is not an argument that the work of either of them is not authentic, particularly when the points of similarity represent less than 3% of the surviving work under discussion⁴. D. at least, for

1. (α) I shall explain later (in the paragr. on Happiness) that the similarity (between D.'s fr. 171 and Heracl. fr. 119) is only apparent and deceptive; the meaning is different.

(b) fr. 268 is not commonplace wisdom more than Lord Acton's aphorism: «All power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely». Both belong to that kind of wisdom which men know only after bitter experience.

(c) fr. 236 (and Heraclitus' 85) might have a common origin in everyday parlance (cf. Chilon's 15: *θυμοῦ κράτει*). Their similarity is only apparent and misleading; their meaning is quite different. According to Heraclitus fighting desire is very difficult nearly impossible; Democritus says it is difficult but it is the proper achievement of a reasonable man (*εὐλόγιστος*). He uses a term of importance in his system of virtues (cf. *λογισμὸς* in frr. 187, 290). It is reasonable that both these thinkers make a comment on a common problem, beginning with the same formula but expressing different aspects (on it).

2. Guthrie, *History*, II 489 footn. 3. He repeats his opinion in the third vol. of his *History of Gr. Philos.*, p. 470 footn. 1.

3. Philippon (*Hermes* 59, 1924, 418) in reply to Lane argues: «Die Alltäglichkeit vieler Sprüche beweist also nichts gegen ihre Echtheit... Weil es wahr war, wurde es banal».

4. 5 frr. of Democrates' collection (64, 65, 45, 40, 77), 3 frr. of Stobaeus' collection (236, 171, 173).

his part, confessed that he had visited Athens for the purpose of listening to Socrates and perhaps he did hear him teaching¹. Since they are contemporary, either of the two might be a lender; D. is the likelier borrower. It would not be strange if he was influenced by that acquaintance with a famous and original thinker².

Less surprise is justified if we remember that ancient sources pointed out the parallel between D. and Plato in their common doctrines³, without suspecting the originality of D.'s work. Guthrie's grounds for suspicion fall mainly on fr. of Democrates' collection.

It is more perplexing (and I am afraid almost impossible) to free Democrates' collection from the suspicion of non-authenticity. So a separate discussion on it might be justified.

Facts and evidence have priority:

1. All these fr. (DK 68 B 35-115) are short aphorisms very likely to be instructions for memorising; many are hardly longer than one line.

2. Compilations from D.'s books or selections of aphorisms attributed to him were in circulation in Diog. Laertius' days, which were perhaps fabrications⁴.

3. The only thinkers who were interested in some of D.'s moral sayings during that period were Cynics (according to a recent and valuable publication on the subject)⁵. But is it not possible that D.'s followers would abstract a collection of aphorisms from the writings of their teacher⁶? It could equally have been a hedonist, if we draw the logical implications from D. Laertius' elucidation of D.'s euthumia⁷.

1. Diog. Laertius 36. Cf. *Diels - Kranz, Fragmente*, 68B 116.

2. Cic., *de orat.* II 46, 194. *De divin.* I. 38. 80 (*Diels - Kranz* 68B 17). Horat., *de art. poet.* 295 (*Diels - Kranz* 68B 17). Clement, *Strom.* VI 168 (*Diels - Kranz* 68B 18). Cf. *RE*. Suppl. 12, 1970, col. 208 [Steckel].

3. To Guthrie's list of common ideas between D. and Socrates should—at first sight—be added fr. 83 which sounds very Socratic. Cf. Guthrie, *History*, III 450 ff. or *Socrates*, 130 ff. The idea of close connection between knowledge and virtue—remembered—was a widespread doctrine during that period.

4. Diog. Laertius, IX 49 (*Diels - Kranz, Fragmente* 68A 33 end).

5. Stewart, *op. cit.*, 184.

6. We have evidence about the existence of a School of Abdera during the fourth century B.C. Cf. Burnet, 157. See: *Diels - Kranz, Fragmente*, II 230-251.

7. Diog. Laertius, IX 45 (*Diels - Kranz, Fragmente*, 68AI, 45): τέλος δ' εἶναι τὴν εὐθυμίαν, οὗ τὴν ἀντὶ τὴν οὐρανὸν τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὡς ἔνιοι παρακούσαντες ἐξεδέξαντο, ἀλλὰ καθ' ἣν γαληνῶς ἢ ψυχῆ διάζει ...

But there are some more important difficulties connected with these fr.

4. A large proportion of them are included also in Stobaeus' Florilegium¹ whose source is obviously different and certainly larger (not only because he preserves many more fr. but also—principally—because most of his abstracts cannot be characterised as aphorisms to be memorised; their structure² or their length³ show that they are parts of a larger context, abstracted from it by the collector for his purpose).

5. Some of them are in some way similar to fr. known also from Stobaeus' collection (either they are shortened forms of them or can accompany them)⁴.

6. Democrates' fr., it is remarked by Laue⁵, are centred round the meaning of *καλὸν καγαθὸν* but this is not accurate, since these notions are (more) equally frequent in the fr. of Stobaeus' collection⁶. By contrast (Laue remarked) Stobaeus' fr. are centred round the concept of euthumia (and egoism); but this is not an acceptable generalisation. Euthumia is an important concept⁷; but justice is also strongly emphasised as an obligation toward others, indispensable for individual happiness and the life of the community⁸.

7. There remain less than half⁹ of the fr. of Democrates' collection which: (a) are not included in the Florilegium of Stobaeus, (b) do not have evident similarity with fr. in it, (c) are not implied from fr. in it, but (d) which also don't contain ideas which should be excluded from D.'s teaching on the ground of incompatibility, if the rest of the Corpus Democriteum is accepted as genuine.

1. 31 altogether (namely): 36, 39, 41, 42, 44, 46-49, 51-2, 53a, 55, 57-64, 73, 75-7, 81, 85-6, 88, 108, 111. fr. 39 is in Stob. III. 37. 22 (not in 25 which *Diels - Kranz* refer to).

2. 175, 191, 238, 257, 259, 262.

3. 191, 228, 235, 252, 253, 266, 277-9.

4. 84 (244, 264), 44 (225), 107a (293), 43 (174 end), 37 (189), 51 (181), 40 (170-171), 102 (191), 104 (294).

5. Laue, *De Democriti fragmentis ethicis*, p. 15.

6. *καλὸν*: 38, 56, 63, 73, 102, 112, 182, 194, 207, 274. *καγαθόν*: 35, 37, 39, 48, 62, 69, 79, 93, 108, 172, 173, 175, 177, 229, 242, 247, 255, 261, 266, 294, 295. Numbers in italics denote fr. included in the two collections.

7. fr. 3, 189, 191, 279, 286, 258, 174.

8. 261, 174, 215, 265, 256, 268, 263, 266. More about this problem in the Meaning of Good(s).

9. These are: 38, 45, 50, 53, 54, 56, 65-70, 72, 74, 76, 79, 82, 83, 87, 89-97, 99, 101, 103, 105-7, 109-110, 112-115.

8. Democrates' collection has a different style¹, structure of statements, vocabulary. Namely:

(a) The conclusive word οὖν (therefore) is never used in Democrates' fr. although it is met several times, in Stobaeus².

(b) Democrates' aphorisms are categorical instructions; no case of demonstration and conclusion can be traced³.

(c) Nowhere in Democrates is there an if-then construction leading from a condition to be fulfilled to a result to be attained (aimed at)⁴.

(d) Words like κόσμος, τύχη, ῥυσμός, ἀνάγκη showing a very probable connection to D.'s genuine vocabulary (used in his physics) are frequent in Stobaeus but non-existent in Democrates⁵.

(e) The concepts of εὐθυμία, τέρψις, ἀτερπία can frequently be traced in Stobaeus' fr. (and fr. attributed to Democritus by other sources beyond doubt) but not in Democrates⁶.

(f) αὐτάρκεια (selfreliance), δίκη, σωφροσύνη are found only in Stobaeus' collection⁷.

(g) Some forms characteristic of the Ionic dialect are found only in Stobaeus' collection⁸.

(h) On the other hand some terms describing human character are found in Democrates' collection, but nowhere in Stobaeus⁹.

9. Additionally, it should be remarked here that, all testimony about D.'s style, particularly his clarity and figurative way of expression (in fr. like 30, 119, 125, 159, all coming from other sources than the two

1. Laue, *De Dem. fragm. ethicis*, pp. 13-14. Cf. *Diels-Kranz*, II 154: «Ob der von Laue statuierte Stilunterschied ... muss eine genauere Untersuchung lehren».

2. fr. 172, 182, 191, 295, 173.

3. Cf. (on the contrary): 173, 191, 179, 181, 187, 228, 235, 252, 253, 264-266, 275-9.

4. Except the introductory fr. 35. But compare: fr. 189, 233, 245, 253, 264.

5. κόσμος in fr. 5C, 21, 34, 180, 195, 247, 258, 259, 274. τύχη in fr. 3 (2), 119 (2), 176, 197, 210, 269, 293. ῥυσμός in fr. 197 (ῥυσμοῦνται), 7 (ἐπιρυσμία), 33 (μεταρυσμοί). ἀνάγκη in fr. 181, 239, 253, 262, 277, 289.

6. τέρψις: 4, 146, 188, 194, 235 (cf. also: 211, 200, 201, 232). ἀτερπία: 4, 174, 188 (cf. also fr. 233). εὐθυμία: 2C, 191, 258 (cf. also: 174, 3, 189, 279, 286).

7. αὐτάρκεια: 4, 209, 246 (cf. 176, 210: αὐτάρκεις). δίκη: 159, 174, 215, 256, 258, 263. σωφροσύνη: 208, 210, 211, 294.

8. κως (266), ὀκίτων (235), ὀκίταν (235), ὀκως 191, 266, 285, 259, 288, ὀκόσα 175, 191, 198, 223, 235, 251, 254.

9. δόκιμος 67, 68, ἀδόκιμος 68, κίβδηλος 63, 82, 93.

collections) permit the assumption that his writings were a rich fountain for collectors of epigrams¹.

From these facts and remarks (above 1-8) the following conclusions might well be justified:

1. Democrates' collection has an obviously different style from that of Stobaeus (remark 8). It seems also to have a different purpose (remark 1).

2. Either Democrates' source is considerably poorer than that of Stobaeus (1, 4) or the intentions of the collector were different. It is possibly (but not necessarily) the work of a Cynic (3).

3. Characteristic terminology of D. is non-existent in Democrates, abundant in Stobaeus (remarks 8 d-e).

4. Stobaeus' collection in its style and structure shows that it might consist of genuine fr. abstracted from a book rich in ideas and distinguished in style (4, 9, 8 a-c).

5. Though the two collections are dissimilar for the reasons noted above, they are not unlike in content (remarks 4-7)².

6. Finally, from all the above evidence, there are strong grounds for recognising Stobaeus' collection as the genuine work of D. in style and content³. And there are strong grounds for the suspicion that Democrates' collection, at least in the form we know, is not genuine work of D., although mirroring D.'s ideas; we cannot overlook the facts (of remarks 4, 5, 7).

Aalders's opinion seems to be justifiable: «So long as a fr. has not been clearly proved to be spurious, we have to accept it as a part of D.'s writings and may not neglect it»⁴. In the final analysis «the *onus probandi* falls on the shoulders of those who deny authenticity»⁵.

Any attempt to reconstruct D's ethical theory has to follow these rules:

1. Cic. *de orat.* I.2.49. *orat.* 20.67. *de divin.* II.64.133: valde Heraclitus obscurus, minime D. Dionys. *de compositione verborum*, 24: φιλοσόφων δὲ κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν Δημόκριτός τε καὶ Πλάτων καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης. τούτων γὰρ ἐτέρους εὐρεῖν ἀμήχανον ἀμεινον κεράσαντας τοὺς λόγους. (*Diels - Kranz*, 68A 34).

2. Cf. *Diels-Kranz*, II 154: «Die inhaltliche Prüfung der Demokratessammlung...».

3. For some remarks on its survival see in the previous paragraph.

4. G. J. D. Aalders, «The political faith of Democritus». In: *Mnemosyne* 4/3, 1950, 302.

5. S. Luria, *Zur Frage der materialistischen Begründung der Ethik bei Demokrit*, Berlin 1964, p. 1.

1. Frs. 1-34, 116-168, 169-297 must be taken as authentic. Inquiries must begin with them.

2. From Democrates' collection those frs. must be used without hesitation which are included also in Stobaeus (e.g. 41, 42, 44, and so forth).

3. From the same group those frs. must be used which show obvious similarity to those in Stobaeus, e.g. 84 (244, 264), or might have similar implications (e.g. 107a, 293).

4. Some of the remaining fragments of Democrates' collection (nearly 40) must be used if and only if they are not contrary to Democritus' ideas.

5. Fr. 299 (spurious in DK edition) can be defended as genuine by comparison to Diog. Laertius, IX 35 (for its content) and fr. 30 (for its terminology). Some remarks can be added on the authenticity of fr. 69 on the ground of its similarity with D.'s epistemology (see frs. 11, 117, 125)¹.

Thessaloniki

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1. For a brief account of D.'s theory of knowledge see: F. Voros, «Truth is in the depth», *Φιλοσοφία*, Ἐπετηρὶς τοῦ Κέντρου Ἐρεῦνης τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς Φιλοσοφίας τῆς Ἀκαδημίας Ἀθηνῶν, 2, 1972, 150-1.